


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
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
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127



January 6, 1975

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MIDDLE EAST – AFRICA – SCUTH ASIA

25X1

Contents

Iran-Iraq: A New Round of Talks	1
North Yemen: Political Pot Boiling Again	3

Jan 6, 1975

25X1

Iran-Iraq

25X1

If the meeting takes place, it will be the third between the foreign ministers since Iranian military intervention in the Iraq-Kurdish war began to increase in mid-August 1974. The first session was held in Istanbul in late August; the second came at the UN General Assembly in October. Neither produced an easing of tensions, but the possibility of future talks was always held open.

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tributing to Iran's uncooperative attitude is the Shah's conviction that the Baghdad regime is implacably hostile to Iran and a tool for Soviet influence.

Any discussions probably will again focus on Iran's demand that Iraq renegotiate the terms of a 1937 treaty defining their southern boundary. Chances for any agreement will be impeded by much more divisive issues such as Iran's military aid to the Kurds and Baghdad's support of subversion of conservative governments in the Persian Gulf. These problems have not been discussed in any significant way because neither government acknowledges such activity is occurring. Iran, for example, claims to give only humanitarian aid to the Kurds.

Iraqi approaches on Iran's role in the Kurdish rebellion, therefore, have been through third parties, primarily President Sadat of Egypt and King Husayn of Jordan. These efforts, however, are not likely to be

(Continued)

Jan 6, 1975

1

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successful. The Shah is convinced that any Iraqi effort to curry favor with more moderate states are simply tactical attempts to reduce internal and external pressures on the regime and are not genuine overtures for better relations. [REDACTED]

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Jan 6, 1975

2

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North Yemen*Political Pot Boiling Again*

North Yemeni political activity, muted in recent weeks, is likely to heat up with the return of former prime minister Hasan al-Amri to Sana on January 4. Al-Amri has been living in exile in Cairo since he was removed as prime minister in 1971 after he murdered a Yemeni citizen.

According to rumors circulating in Sana, al-Amri is to become chairman of the ruling command council, and its current head, Colonel Ibrahim al-Hamdi, is to step down to the deputy position. The same rumors indicate that Prime Minister Muhsin al-Ayni will be ousted as part of the political turnover.

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We believe it unlikely that Colonel Hamdi's power will be diminished. He appears to have steadily consolidated his position in recent months. It is unlikely that he would voluntarily give up power or suffer such a loss without a struggle.

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(Continued)

Jan 6, 1975

3

25X1

25X6

There is a serious question of al-Amri's acceptability to leftist elements in the country, whatever position he might be offered. He is a strong rightist and probably acceptable to conservative tribal sheikhs, even though he moved harshly against dissident tribes in 1971. If al-Amri returns to a position of power, the government will probably crack down on the Iraqi and South Yemeni supported leftists in the country as well as adopt a tougher policy toward South Yemen. In any case, al-Amri's return to North Yemen could produce a leftist reaction and disrupt the political situation.

25X1

Jan 6, 1975

4

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